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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff/Appellee,

Case No. 990117-CA

v.
TRACEY JOE McCLOY,

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from convictions for possession of methamphetamine in a drug
free zone with intent to distribute, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§
58-37-8(1), -8(4) (1998), possession of marijuana in a drug free zone with intent to
distribute, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37-8(1), -8(4)
(1998), and possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5(l) (1998), in the Second Judicial District Court in and for
Weber County, State of Utah, the Honorable Roger S. Dutson, presiding. This Court has
jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1996).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1. Did the trial court properly conclude that there was probable cause to search
defendant's residence? On appeal, the appellate court does not conduct a de novo review
of the magistrate's probable cause determination, see State v. Collard. 810 P.2d 884, 885

(Utah App.) (citations omitted), cert, denied, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991), but only
"determines whether the issuing magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that
there were enough facts within the affidavit to find that probable cause existed." State v.
Potter. 860 P.2d 952, 956 (Utah App. 1993) (citations omitted).
2. Has defendant demonstrated that his trial counsel was ineffective? If a claim of
ineffectiveness is raised for the first time on appeal, it will be reviewed only "if the trial
record is adequate to permit decision of the issue . . . . " State v. Humphries. 818 P.2d
1027, 1029 (Utah 1991).
3. Should this Court consider the multiple issues raised in defendant's pro se
supplemental brief where defendant has failed to adequately brief the issue? "'[I]t is well
established that an appellate court will decline to consider an argument that a party has
failed to adequately brief.'99 State v. Thomas. 974 P.2d 269, 272 (Utah 1999) (citing
Valcarce v. Fitzgerald. 961 P.2d 305, 313 (Utah 1998)).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES
The following determinative constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules are
attached at Addendum A:
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution;
Rule 24, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Tracy McCloy, was charged with possession of methamphetamine in a
drug free zone with intent to distribute, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
2

Ann. §§ 58-37-8(1), -8(4) (1998) (Count I), possession of marijuana in a drug free zone
with intent to distribute, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 5837-8(1), -8(4) (1998) (Count II), and possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5(l) (1998) (Count III) (R. 1-3).
Defendant, pro se, moved to dismiss the charges, alleging various police misconduct, and
to suppress the evidence obtained in a search of his residence (R. 101-183). Following a
hearing on April 28, 1998 (R. 389:Tab 1:1-123), the trial court denied both motions
(Memorandum Decision, R. 185-187). Represented by counsel, defendant filed a new
motion to suppress evidence (R. 236, 254-57). Following a hearing on June 26, 1998 (R.
389:Tab 2:1-23), the trial court denied the motion (Memorandum Decision, R. 268-71,
"Ruling," attached at Addendum B), based on a review of the affidavit in support of the
search warrant (R. 188-94, attached at Addendum C). A jury convicted defendant on all
counts (R. 331-33). The trial court sentenced defendant to consecutive statutory five-tolife (Count I) and one-to-fifteen year (Count II) terms in the Utah State Prison, merging
the sentence on Count III with the other two sentences (R. 362-63). The Utah Supreme
Court poured this case over to this Court on March 16, 1999.
Defendant timely appealed and thereafter filed an opening brief through his
appellate counsel, Maurice Richards, on June 21, 1999 (R. 381). Defendant, pro se, filed
a motion for reappointment of counsel. This Court denied the motion on September 7,
1999, but granted defendant leave to file a pro se supplemental brief. The State's brief

3

herein is responsive to both defendant's opening and supplemental briefs.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1
On March 13, 1997, Agent Mark Acker, assigned to the Weber Morgan Narcotics
Strike Force, prepared and signed an affidavit in support of a warrant to search
defendant's residence, a white house located at 1612 Kiesel Ave., Ogden, Utah, based on
probable cause that defendant was in possession of marijuana, methamphetamine and
paraphernalia used to consume and sell these controlled substances (R. 188-89, 192).
The affidavit recited the following facts in support of probable cause that
controlled substances would be found on the premises: (1) Agent Acker's extensive
experience in drug interdiction (R. 189); (2) Odgen Police computer records verified that
defendant had given 1612 Kiesel Ave. as his residence (R. 191); (3) information from a
citizen informant who observed heavy short term vehicular and pedestrian traffic in which
numerous different people stayed for both short and long periods of time and brought

1

Because the brief filed by defendant's appellate counsel addresses issues related
only to defendant's motion to suppress evidence, and because defendant's pro se
supplemental brief is unsupported by any record support, this factual statement recites
facts related only to the motion to suppress. Those facts are recited most favorably to the
trial court'sfindingsdenying the motion to suppress. State v. Tetmyer. 947 P.2d 1157,
1158 (Utah App. 1997) ("Because we are reviewing the trial court's decision denying
defendant's motion to suppress, we recite the facts in a light most favorable to the trial
court'sfindings.")(citing State v. Montova. 937 P.2d 145, 147 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). The
State's statement of facts substantially restates facts set out in the affidavit supporting the
search warrant at issue in this case. Although defendant claims the affidavit sets out
insufficient probable cause to support the warrant, he does not challenge the accuracy of
the affidavits.
4

stereos and other personal property into defendant's residence (R. 189-90); (4)
information from a reliable confidential informant that drugs could readily be purchased
at defendant's residence and that a great deal of stolen property from the Ogden area was
being traded for methamphetamine at defendant's residence (R. 190); (5) the police
determined that some of the visitors to defendant's residence were involved in drugs or
receiving stolen property (R. 190); (6) within the previous four days a confidential
informant, on whom CI control methods were applied, and an unwitting informant had
purchased methamphetamine on two occasions, one of which buys was observed by an
undercover agent (R. 190); and (7) the day before the affidavit was signed, a person
arrested in an unrelated drug investigation told another agent of the Davis Metro
Narcotics Force that he was buying methamphetamine from a male named "Tracey" who
lived in a white house on Kiesel Ave. between 16th and 17th Streets in which there was
stolen property, such as stereos, and that "Tracey" sold ounces of methamphetamine at
the house (R. 191).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I
The trial court correctly determined that there was probable cause to search
defendant's residence. The court made its determination of probable cause based on its
review of the affidavit in support of the warrant and without reliance on any prior
hearings, transcriptions of which defendant has failed to make part of the record on

5

appeal. Also, defendant has failed to marshal the facts recited in the affidavit which show
that he was involved in the drug trade and engaged in drug sales out of his residence a
few days before the affidavit was drafted.
POINT II
Because defendant has failed to specifically identify what prior proceedings his
counsel failed to consider and has failed to make such proceedings part of the record on
appeal, this Court should decline to consider his claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel. Alternatively, defendant has failed to demonstrate ineffective assistance of
counsel for lack of a supporting record.
POINT HI
The Court should decline to consider claims made by defendant, pro se, in his
supplemental brief. The claims are generally made without citation to the record and
unsupported by relevant legal authority. More importantly, defendant has generally failed
to include in the record on appeal alleged evidence in support of his claims. In those
instances where record evidence is available, it fails to support defendant's claims.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE AFFIDAVIT AMPLY SETS FORTH EVIDENCE OF THE
INFORMANT'S RELIABILITY AND PROBABLE CAUSE TO
SUPPORT THE WARRANT AUTHORIZING THE SEARCH OF
DEFENDANT'S RESIDENCE
Defendant cursorily asserts that the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress is
6

based on an inadequate record and that the court incorrectly determined that the affidavit
in support of the search warrant set forth probable cause for the search. Specifically,
defendant asserts that the ruling was based on the court's familiarity with information
alleged to be unavailable, an affidavit which recited only unverified tips and the affiant
officer's unverified tips, and an improper discounting of police misconduct. Br. App. at
11-13. The trial court's ruling, on its face, readily disposes of defendant's arguments.
A.

Defendant Fails to Show that the Record is Inadequate
to Support the Trial Court's Findings and Conclusions,

1.

Review of a Trial Court's Findings is Highly Deferential.

In State v. Pena, the Utah Supreme Court set out a highly deferential standard for
reviewing a trial court's findings of fact:
Trial courts are given primary responsibility for making
determinations of fact. Findings of fact are reviewed by an appellate court
under the clearly erroneous standard. For a reviewing court to find clear
error, it must decide that the factual findings made by the trial court are not
adequately supported by the record, resolving all disputes in the evidence in
a light most favorable to the trial couifs determination. See Wessel v.
Erickson Landscaping Co., 711 P.2d 250, 252 (Utah 1985): see also United
States v. United States Gvpsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 92 L. Ed. 746, 68
S. Ct. 525 (1948). This standard is highly deferential to the trial court
because it is before that court that the witnesses and parties appear and the
evidence is adduced. The judge of that court is therefore considered to be
in the best position to assess the credibility of witnesses and to derive a
sense of the proceeding as a whole, something an appellate court cannot
hope to garner from a cold record. In re J. Children. 664 P.2d 1158, 1161
(Utah 1983). [Emphasis added.]
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932,936 (Utah 1994). "Clear error is indicated when the trial
court's factual assessment is against the clear weight of the evidence or it induces a firm
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conviction that a mistake has been committed." State v. Droneburg. 781 P.2d 1303,
(Utah App. 1989) (citing State v. Ashe. 745 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah 1987)).
2.

The Trial Court Reasonably Based its Ruling on the Affidavit.

The trial court acknowledged in its ruling that it had become very familiar with the
case from prior hearings and from reading the file in its entirety several times (R. 268).
Defendant asserts that relevant portions of the prior proceedings, including videotapes,
are "unavailable," and therefore, this Court should reverse the trial court's ruling. There
are several flaws in defendant's argument.
First, in challenging a trial court's findings, a defendant bears the burden of
marshaling all the evidence and then showing, in spite of all the evidence, that the court's
findings of fact are clearly erroneous. State v. Larsen. 828 P.2d 487,491 (Utah App.
1992).
Rule 12(e)(2), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, provides:
If the appellant intends to urge on appeal that a finding or conclusion
is unsupported by or is contrary to the evidence, the appellant shall include
in the record a transcript of all evidence relevant to such finding or
conclusion. Neither the court nor the appellee is obligated to correct
appellant's deficiencies in providing the relevant portions of the transcript.
If a critical portion of the record necessary for this Court to determine the issues on
appeal is missing, the burden is on defendant to reconstruct it. See Utah R. App. P. 12(g)
("If no report of the evidence or proceedings at a hearing or trial was made, or if a
transcript is unavailable,... the appellant may prepare a statement of the evidence or

8

proceedings from the best available means, including recollection."); Guardian State
Bank v. Humphervs, 762 P.2d 1084 (Utah 1988) (purpose of the rule is to avoid the
court's attempting to recreate the record of a hearing based upon conflicting testimony of
counsel). Defendant has neither precisely identified which portions of the record are
unavailable nor made any attempt to reconstruct such record. Without a record, which
defendant implicitly argues would alter the outcome of the case, this Court must presume
the trial court's ruling was founded on sufficient evidence. See State v. Blubaugh. 904
P.2d 688, 699 (Utah App. 1995) (an appellate court will "assume the regularity of the
proceedings below when appellant fails to provide an adequate record on appeal")
(citing Jolivet v. Cook, 784 P.2d 1148, 1150 (Utah 1989)), cert, denied. 913 P.2d 749
(Utah 1996).
In any case, the ruling, by its terms, does not rely on prior proceedings. While
recognizing that there were prior hearings, the court commenced its discussion by stating:
"Other issues, however, are raised in this motion" (R. 268). The court then proceeded to
note the impropriety of some of the police conduct and stated: "The court has taken this
police/prosecution position into consideration in reviewing the claims of the defendant in
this case" (R. 269). Thereafter, the court assessed the showing of probable cause based
only on the affidavit in support of the search warrant, as agreed by counsel at the hearing

9

(R. 269; 389:2-3).2 There is no indication that any other record was important to the court
in assessing probable cause.
B.

The Affidavit Amply Supports the Confidential Informant's
Reliability and Probable Cause to Search Defendant's Residence,

1.

The Appellate Court Reviews the Magistrate's
Determination of Probable Cause Deferentially.

"Before issuing a search warrant, a neutral magistrate must review an affidavit
containing specific facts sufficient to support a finding of probable cause." State v.
Potter, 860 P.2d 952, 956 (Utah App.1993) (citing State v. Purser, 828 P.2d 515, 517
(Utah App. 1992)) (citation omitted). "In determining whether probable cause exists, the
magistrate must 'make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the
circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the "veracity" and "basis of
knowledge" of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.'" id. (citing Illinois
v. Gates. 462 U.S. 213, 239, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2332 (1983)).
On appeal, the appellate court does not conduct a de novo review of the
magistrate's probable cause determination, see State v. Collard. 810 P.2d 884, 885 (Utah
App.) (citations omitted), cert, denied, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991), but only "determines

2

The hearing on defendant's motion to suppress was held on June 26, 1998 (R.
389:1). The only exception to the blanket sufficiency of the record at this hearing was the
court's recognition that it found the omission of the year in which the search warrant was
signed a technical defect remedied by evidence from an earlier hearing (R. 389:11-12).
On appeal, defendant does not challenge the technical sufficiency of the search warrant.
10

whether the issuing magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that there were
enough facts within the affidavit to find that probable cause existed." Potter 860 P.2d at
956 (citations omitted). Accordingly, the appellate court reviews the affidavit in m"its
entirety and in a common sense fashion/"" according deference to the magistrate's
determination. State v. Jackson. 937 P.2d 545, 547 (Utah App. 1997), cert, denied. 945
P.2d 1118 (Utah 1997) (citations omitted).
2. The Warrant was Supported by Probable Cause
The court reviewed the essential assertions set out in the affidavit:
- the affiant (Agent Mark Acker, Weber Morgan Narcotics Strike Force), was a
12-year veteran police officer with extensive experience in drug
interdiction (R. 269);3
- one month earlier a citizen informant contacted Agent Acker and told him that
there was heavy short term vehicular and pedestrian traffic, in which
numerous different people stayed for both short and long periods of time;
the traffic peaked on Fridays and continued through the weekend, during
which time some people brought VCR's, stereos and other property to
defendant's residence; based on his experience, the agent recognized that
the heavy flow of people with such personal property indicated illegal drug
activity (R. 269-70);
- another agent (Agent Van Orden) informed Agent Acker that a very reliable
confidential informant informed Agent Van Orden that drugs could be
purchased from defendant (R. 270);
- based on a check of license plate numbers, several of the owners of vehicles
going to defendant's residence were involved in drugs or receiving
stolen property;

3

The affidavit sets out in detail and at considerable length Agent Acker's
extensive experience and training in drug interdiction (R. 189).
11

another agent (Agent King) reported to Agent Acker that within the previous
four days a wired confidential informant, with an unwitting informant, on
two separate occasions had purchased drugs, which later field tested
positive for amphetamines (R. 270); one of the buys was observed by
an undercover agent (R. 270).4
The court recognized, in detail, what it considered to be inappropriate police and
prosecution conduct in pursuing defendant in this and other cases, and improper,
potentially inflammatory information relating to defendant's criminal history in the
affidavit (R. 269-71). Nonetheless, the court concluded, "[u]pon careful consideration of
the totality of properly included facts, and in considering the possibility of improper
inflammatory statements being included in the affidavit and an overzealous attitude by the
police towards the defendant, the court concludes there was still more than adequate
evidence in the affidavit to support the issuance of a search warrant and denies the
defendant's motion to suppress" (R. 270-71).
Defendant fails to show that the trial court's ruling is incorrect. In challenging the
ruling, defendant first asserts that the trial court "acknowledged that the affidavit

4

The affidavit more fully describes the Agent King's observations. Agent King
used CI control methods, including searching the CI before and after the transaction and
monitoring the transaction electronically and visually. On one of the buys, Agent King
and assisting agents observed the unwitting informant go into defendant's residence to
make the drug purchase. On the other buy, Agent King and assisting agents witnessed the
unwitting informant go in and then out of defendant's residence following the purchase
(R. 190-91). Defendant does not challenge the trial court's recognition that facts
concerning the unwitting informant's reliability are not always available (R. 269). Such
facts necessarily cannot include a search of the unwitting informant's person for drugs
before the buy.
12

contained no separate evidence regarding the reliability of any informant, but concluded
that such failure is not fatal." App. Br. at 12. First, defendant mischaracterizes the
court's concern about verification of reliability. The ruling plainly reflects the court's
satisfaction with the reliability of the confidential informant who supplied information to
Agent Van Orden, information which undisputedly helped establish defendant's drug
involvement (R. 270). Rather, the court's concern obviously went to the unspecified
reliability of the confidential and unwitting informants who served Agent King in two
drug buys just days before the affidavit was drafted (R. 269). While the reliability of
these latter two informants was not stated, the court noted, "[f]ailure to provide separate
evidence regarding the reliability of an informant is not fatal in and of itself, and when an
informant is an 'unwitting' informant, such facts often are not available" (R. 269).
Defendant makes no legal argument or cites to any authority challenging the trial court's
view that the undetermined reliability of an informant, especially an unwitting informant,
is not fatal in determining probable cause. See State v. Thomas. 974 P.2d 269, 271-72
(Utah 1999) (,,f[A] reviewing court is entitled to have the issues clearly defined with
pertinent authority cited and is not simply a depository in which the appealing party may
dump the burden of argument and research.'") (quoting State v. Bishop. 753 P.2d 439,
450 (Utah 1988)) (additional citation omitted); State v. Wareham. 772 P.2d 960, 966
(Utah 1989) (asserting that "[a] brief must contain some support for each contention," and
declining to rule on issue where the defendant's brief "wholly lacked legal analysis and
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authority to support his argument"). Moreover, the reliability of the confidential
informant is immaterial where the informant was subjected to the control methods recited
in the affidavit, to wit: "searching the CI before and after the transaction, placing a
transmitter on the CI and monitoring the transaction electronically and visually" (R. 190).
Defendant also fails to marshal the evidence in support of the ruling. Instead,
defendant simply states that the court noted that the officer was a twelve-year veteran
with extensive experience in drug cases and that the officer had merely gathered
unverified information from informants through other police officers that controlled
substances were being sold out of defendant's residence. App. Br. at 12-13. At the very
least, defendant has failed to note (1) the citizen's informant's observations of heavy
traffic indicating drug trade at defendant's residence (R. 269-70); (2) that Agent Van
Orden used a reliable confidential informant who asserted that defendant sold drugs (R.
270); and (3) that Agent King witnessed the unwitting informant in one drug buy go into
defendant's residence and return with methamphetamine (R. 270). Moreover, in support
of his argument, defendant cites only State v. Covington, 904 P.2d 209 (Utah App. 1995).
However, defendant's recitation of the facts of Covington, which found the affidavit set
out sufficient probable cause for an all persons warrant, supports the court's ruling in this
case. Thus, defendant again fails to support his claim with relevant argument or citation
to authority. See Thomas, 974 P.2d at 271-72. In sum, defendant fails to show that the
court incorrectly found there was probable cause to support the search.

i4

POINT II
DEFENDANT'S INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
CLAIM FAILS BECAUSE DEFENDANT HAS NOT PROVIDED
ANY RECORD SHOWING THAT HIS TRIAL COUNSEL'S
FAILURE TO CONSIDER CERTAIN TRANSCRIPTS AND
VIDEOTAPES WOULD HAVE AFFECTED THE OUTCOME OF
THE CASE
"[An appellate court] review[s] a challenge of ineffective assistance of counsel
by first determining whether counsel's performance was deficient and, if so,
determining whether the deficient performance prejudiced defendant. State v.
Severance. 828 P.2d 1066, 1070 (Utah App. 1992) (citing Strickland v. Washington.
446 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984)).
"Proof of ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be a speculative matter but
must be a demonstrable reality." Fernandez v. Cook. 870 P.2d 870, 877 (Utah 1993).
Thus, when a defendant raises an ineffective assistance claim for the first time on
appeal, the claim should be reviewed only "if the . . . record is adequate to permit
decision of the issue." State v. Humphries. 818 P.2d 1027, 1029 (Utah 1991).
Further, an appellate court will "assume the regularity of the proceedings below when
appellant fails to provide an adequate record on appeal." Blubaugh. 904 P.2d at 699
(citations omitted). In State v. Wulffenstein. 657 P.2d 289 (Utah 1982), the Utah
Supreme Court stated:
When a defendant predicates error to [an appellate court], he has
the duty and responsibility of supporting such allegation by an adequate
record. Absent that record, defendant's assignment of error stands as a
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unilateral allegation which the review court has no power to determine.
This Court simply cannot rule on a question which depends for its
existence upon alleged facts unsupported by the record.
Id. at 293 (citations omitted).5
Defendant argues that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel
in failing review the hearing on defendant's pro se motion to suppress and
"videotapes," and in failing to present any additional information in support of his
motion. App. Br. at 15. However, because defendant has failed to provide this Court
with any record in support of his claim, this Court should decline to even consider it.6
5

See also rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure ("The argument shall
contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented,
including the grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, with
citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on."); State v. Thomas.
961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998) (refusing to consider inadequately briefed claim under
rule 24(a)(9), and stating "that this court is not ma depository in which the appealing party
may dump the burden of argument and research"') (quoting State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439,
450 (Utah 1988)) (original citation omitted).
6

Additionally, defendant has at no point moved for an evidentiary hearing,
pursuant to rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, to create a record establishing
ineffective assistance of counsel. Defendant argues that his counsel merely argued the
legal position in his motion without calling any witnesses. However, counsel did
consider a tape recorded conversation between Agent Acker and the prosecutor, from
which he may have been further assured of the reasonableness of presenting the motion
without witnesses. See State v. Crosby. 927 P.2d 638, 644 (Utah 1996) (the reviewing
court will give trial counsel wide latitude in making tactical decisions and will not
question such decisions unless there is no reasonable basis supporting them) (citing
Taylor v. Warden. 905 P.2d 277, 282 (Utah 1995)). Moreover, to the extent that any
record of prior relevant proceedings is unavailable, as defendant asserts, see App. Br. at
10, the burden is plainly on defendant to reconstruct it. See Utah R. App. P. 12(g) ("If no
report of the evidence or proceedings at a hearing or trial was made, or if a transcript is
unavailable,... the appellant may prepare a statement of the evidence or proceedings
from the best available means, including recollection."); Guardian State Bank v.
16

Alternatively, defendant's claim fails for lack of record support. See State v.
ArgueHes, 921 P.2d 439, 441 (Utah 1996) (rejecting ineffective assistance upon claim
counsel prevented the defendant from testifying where neither the record nor the
defendant's brief indicated what his testimony would have been if he had testified);
State v. Templin. 805 P.2d 183, 188 n.26 (Utah 1990) (finding that the defendant had
failed to show prejudice in his counsel's failure to investigate a particular witness
because "[he had] not provided this court with any evidence concerning what [the
witness] would have testified to if he had been called during trial"); State v. Callahan.
866 P.2d 590, 593 (Utah App. 1993) (summarily disposing of claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel where neither the record nor defendant's brief identified witnesses
that counsel failed to subpoena or alleged the substance of their testimony); Severance.
828 P.2d at 1070 (finding no reasonable probability of a different result at trial where
the record did not indicate whether a witness would have testified more favorably at
trial, and evidence against the defendant was overwhelming). In sum, this Court
should reject defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

Humpherys. 762 P.2d 1084, 1089-90 (Utah 1988) (purpose of the rule is to avoid the
court's attempting to recreate the record of a hearing based upon conflicting testimony of
counsel). In the absence of the record defendant asserts his counsel was ineffective in
overlooking, any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is purely speculative.
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POINT III
BECAUSE DEFENDANT'S PRO SE SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF
SUBSTANTIALLY FAILS TO CONFORM TO THE
REQUIREMENTS OF RULE 24, UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE
PROCEDURE, AND BECAUSE DEFENDANT'S CLAIMS ARE
GENERALLY UNSUPPORTED BY ANY RECORD EVIDENCE,
THE COURT SHOULD DECLINE TO CONSIDER THEM
A.

This Court will Decline to Consider
An Issue Inadequately Briefed on Appeal.

'"[A] reviewing court is entitled to have the issues clearly defined with pertinent
authority cited and is not simply a depository in which the appealing party may dump the
burden of argument and research.'" State v. Thomas. 974 P.2d 269, (Utah 1999) (quoting
State v. Bishop. 753 P.2d 439, 450 (Utah 1988)). "Furthermore, 'it is well established
that an appellate court will decline to consider an argument that a party has failed to
adequately brief.'" Id (quoting Valcarce v. Fitzgerald. 961 P.2d 305, 313 (Utah 1998)).
See also State v. Vigil. 922 P.2d 15,25 (Utah App. 1996) (refusing to consider challenge
to trial court's failure ask prospective jurors a requested question unsupported by any
factual analysis); State v. Stereer. 808 P.2d 122,125 n.2 (Utah App. 1991) ("Because
defendant fails to cite support or provide any meaningful analysis as to [arguments
concerning the search of a vehicle], we decline to rule on them.")..
Rule 24, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, provides criteria that are essential for
a reasonably founded, intelligible argument on appeal.7 This Court has regularly declined
7

Rule 24, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, provides in pertinent part:
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to consider an argument which does not comply with the rule. See State v. Price, 827
P.2d 247, 247 (Utah App. 1992) ("We have routinely refused to consider arguments
which do not include a statement of the facts properly supported by citations to the
record."); State v. Garza. 820 P.2d 937, 939 (Utah App. 1991) (court refuses to reach an
issue because defendant "failed to include a statement of facts in her brief, as required by
Rule 24(a)(7)"). Other than a conclusion, defendant's supplemental brief lacks every
requirement set forth in rule 24.8 In particular, defendant's brief lacks (1) a statement of
(a) Brief of the appellant. The brief of the appellant shall contain under
appropriate headings and in the order indicated:
(5) A statement of the issues presented for review, including for each issue:
the standard of appellate review with supporting authority; and
(A) citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved
in the trial court;
(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of
the appellant with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for
reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the
authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on.
(11) An addendum to the brief or a statement that no addendum is necessary
under this paragraph. The addendum shall be bound as part of the brief
unless doing so makes the brief unreasonably thick. If the addendum is
bound separately, the addendum shall contain a table of contents. The
addendum shall contain a copy of:
(C) those parts of the record on appeal that are of central
importance to the determination of the appeal, such as the
challenged instructions, findings of fact and conclusions of
law, memorandum decision, the transcript of the court's oral
decision, or the contract or document subject to construction.
8

The State recognizes that because defendant's motion is directed to his
supplemental brief, no jurisdictional statement or statement of the case would be needed
19

issues presented for review with a citation to the record showing that the issue was
preserved in the trial court, (2) a statement of the case, (3) any citation to the record, and
(4) any meaningful argument or citation to legal authority. Therefore, the Court should
decline to consider defendant's claims.
B.

This Court Must Presume Regularity Where
Defendant Has Not Made Part of the Record
Evidence Supporting His Claims,

More importantly, this Court cannot evaluate the validity of the claims defendant
asserts in his supplemental brief because he has failed to provide record support for any
of those claims:
Parties claiming error below and seeking appellate review have the duty and
responsibility to support their allegations with an adequate record." 'Absent
that record defendant's assignment of error stands as a unilateral allegation
which the review court has no power to determine. This Court simply
cannot rule on a question which depends for its existence upon alleged facts
unsupported by the record.' " State v. Barella. 714 P.2d 287, 288 (Utah
1986) (emphasis in original) (quoting State v. Wulffenstein, 657 P.2d 289,
293 (Utah 1982), cert, denied, 460 U.S. 1044, 103 S.Ct. 1443, 75 L.Ed.2d
799(1983)).
State v. Wetzel. 868 P.2d 64, 67 (Utah 1994) (affirming trial court's denial of challenges
for where the defendant failed to supply transcript of jury voir dire). "If an appellant fails

because those requirements are at least partially satisfied by defendant's opening brief,
filed by his appellate counsel. However, defendant's opening brief challenged only the
denial of his motion to suppress and a related claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,
and it limited its rendition of the facts accordingly. Br. of App. at 6-7, 9-15. Defendant's
supplemental brief, on the other hand, primarily attacks proceedings at the preliminary
hearing, hearing on his pro se motion to dismiss, and trial, but contains no factual
statement of these proceedings.
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to provide an adequate record on appeal, this Court must assume the regularity of the
proceedings below." Jolivet v. Cook. 784 P.2d 1148, 1150 (Utah 1989) cert, denied, 493
U.S. 1033,110 S.Ct. 751 (1990) (emphasis added). Utah's appellate courts have
uniformly approved the regularity of proceedings in criminal cases where the defendant
has failed to make part of the record on appeal evidence necessary to the evaluation of a
claim of error. See State v. Robertson. 932 P.2d 1219, 1226 (Utah 1997) (competency
hearing); State v. Miller. 718 P.2d 403,405 (1986) (plea hearing); State v. Jones. 657
P.2d 1263, 1267 (Utah 1982) (closing argument); Lavton City v. Longcrier. 943 P.2d 645,
661 (Utah App. 1999) (witness testimony); State v. Blubaugh. 904 P.2d 688, 699 (Utah
App. 1995) (witness testimony); State v. Maas. 846 P.2D 468, 474 (Utah App. 1993)
(closing argument).
Defendant asserts five claims of error in his supplemental brief, which are a grab
bag of cavils that are uniformly unsupported by record citations and which, with the
exception of the fifth claim, generally depend on alleged evidence that is not part of the
record:
L

Prosecution's Use ofAlleged False Evidence

Defendant claims that during the hearing on his pro se motion to dismiss, heard on
April 28,1998, Agent Acker falsely testified that he found "a large chunk of
methamphetamine weighing 6.5 grams" at defendant's residence. Supp. Br. App. at 2. In
support, defendant asserts that Agent Van Orden, the "designated finder," never stated
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that she found "any large chunk of methamphetamine . . . in her police report or search
warrant inventory

" Supp. Br. App. at 3. Defendant also asserts that the agent for the

Weber State University Crime Lab never testified to finding any "large chunk of
methamphetamine weighing 6.5 grams" at the preliminary hearing. Supp. Br. App. at 3.
Not only is defendant's argument completely devoid of record citations, but Agent
Van Orden's police report and search warrant inventory are not part of the record on
appeal. Moreover, defendant's claim that Agent Acker testified falsely is not supported
by the record. At the hearing on defendant's pro se motion to dismiss, Agent Acker read
into the record his report that he had found a small zippered bag on the couch in the front
room of defendant's residence (R. 389Tab 1:31). According to the report, the bag
contained a small Zip-Loc baggie which contained a "large chunk of methamphetamine
which later weighed out to be about 6.5 grams" and some vials and bottles also containing
methamphetamine, all of which he estimated weighed about a quarter of an ounce (R.
389:Tab 1:31-35). He also stated that he weighed the "large chunk" without removing it
from the Zip-Loc baggie, and that his weight measurements often differed from those of
the crime lab (R. 389:Tab 1:28-29, 35). Consistent with Agent Acker's testimony, Agent
Van Orden verified at trial that she found a zippered bag containing "approximately a
quarter ounce of meth" distributed among the various vials and baggies (R. 391:10-11).9
9

A gram "is equal to about 1/28 of an ounce." Webster's New World Dictionary
628 (College ed. 1956). Therefore, the approximate one-quarter ounce of
methamphetamine found by Agent Van Orden confirmed the 6.5 grams of
methamphetamine attested to by Agent Acker.
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Further, although Don Thurgood, a criminalist with the Utah State Crime Lab, did not
testify at the preliminary hearing how much methamphetamine the vials and baggies
contained (R. 388:36, 39), at trial he stated that collectively the vials and baggies in the
zippered bag contained 7.6 grams of methamphetamine (R. 390:241-45). Thus, at worst,
Agent Acker's estimates were in error by only a few tenths of a gram, a discrepancy that
hardly proves he testified falsely.
Defendant also asserts that he possesses audio and videotapes and documents that
he was prevented from presenting to the jury that allegedly prove that the prosecutor and
police officers made false statements at trial and pretrial hearings and that he was
prejudiced by Judge Brent W. West's "biased" opinions in pretrial hearings. Supp. Br.
App. at 3. Defendant has failed to state what false or biased statements were made, when
or where such statements were made, and where such statements appear in the record.
Further, the alleged tapes or documents on which defendant relies are not part of the
record on appeal.
2.

Allegation of Search without Warrant or Supporting Affidavit

Defendant asserts that the search warrant and the supporting affidavit did not even
exist when the search was executed and that the affidavit falsely relied on nonexistent
confidential informants and police surveillance and that it was libelous. Supp. Br. App. at
4-7. In support, defendant claims that he possesses the videotape of a conversation at the
preliminary hearing between the prosecutor and Agent Acker while Judge West was out
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of the courtroom in which Agent Acker acknowledged that "he did not know an affidavit
went with a search warrant." Supp. Br. App. at 4. However, the videotape is not part of
the record on appeal, and so it is impossible to evaluate defendant's claim. Moreover, to
the extent there is a record on this point, Agent Acker testified at the hearing on
defendant's pro se motion to dismiss that during the conversation he merely informed the
prosecutor that he did not want to disclose the identities of the confidential informants for
their protection (R. 389:Tab 1:17-21).
3.

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel for Failure to Subpoena Witnesses

Defendant appears to claim that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to meet
with him before trial to discuss trial strategy and to list witnesses defendant wanted
subpoenaed at trial. However, defendant's claim is unsupported by any record evidence
about what witnesses defendant requested or their expected testimony. See Br. of Applee.
at Point II (discussing defendant's failure to show ineffective assistance of counsel).
4.

Denial of Right to Confront Confidential Informants

Defendant claims that he was denied his right to confront confidential informants,
who allegedly gave false information helping to establish probable cause to search his
residence. Supp. Br. App. at 8-9. This argument is unsupported by any citation to the
record or controlling authority or any reference to what information was false or to which
officers the information was given.
Moreover, the claim in without merit. The trial court correctly explained that
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because the prosecution did not intend to use any information from informants in its casein-chief and because there was no indication that they possessed exculpatory information,
it was unnecessary at that stage of the proceedings for the prosecution to disclose the
identity of its informants (R. 389:Tab 1:59). See State v. Collier. 736 P.2d 231, (Utah 1987)
("The right to be confronted with the witnesses against him does not automatically give a
defendant the right to have disclosed to him by the prosecution the identity of a
confidential informer.") (citing McCrav v. Illinois. 386 U.S. 300, 308-9, 311-13 (1967));
State v. Neilsen. 727 P.2d 188, 193 (Utah 1986) ("As a matter of due process, the identity
of a confidential informant must be disclosed only when such disclosure is 'essential to a
fair determination of the issues.9") (quoting State v. Forshee. 611 P.2d 1222,1224 (Utah
1980)). Defendant fails to argue that confrontation with any informant could have
provided information useful to his defense. See id. 727 P.2d at (summarily disposing of
due process challenge to prosecution's refusal to disclose confidential informant's
identity where the defendant "[could] not make some showing that disclosure of an
informant's identity [was] material and essential to his defense").10 Moreover, at no point
does defendant assert that he was not involved in the drug trafficking observed by

10

Defendant also appears to claim that police officers gave testimony at trial that
was double hearsay, apparently a reference to the officers' repetition of information given
to them by informants. Supp. Br. App. at 9. The argument is made in a single sentence
without any citation to the record or legal authority or reference to the particular
statements being challenged. The Court should decline to consider it. See State v.
Wareham. 772 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1989) (declining to rule on issue where defendant's
brief "wholly lacked legal analysis and authority to support his argument").
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informants or that he was not in possession of the methamphetamine and marijuana
discovered in his home when the police executed the warrant.
5.

Trial Court9s Error in Finding Warrant Technically Sufficient

Defendant argues that the trial court incorrectly concluded that the warrant was
technically sufficient. Supp. Br. App. at 9-12. In support of his claim, defendant argues
that neither the warrant nor affidavit is time-stamped, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 7723-204 (1999), and that the affidavit in support of the warrant is illegible, omits the year
in the date, and evidences two different signers because of discrepancies in the
handwriting of the date. Supp. Br. App. at 10-11.
"Generally, an issue must be expressly preserved below to warrant appellate
consideration." State v. Brown. 856 P.2d 358, 360 (Utah App. 1993) (stating "to ensure
trial court's opportunity to consider an issue, appellate review of criminal cases in Utah
requires 'that a contemporaneous objection or some form of specific preservation of
claims of error must be made a part of the trial court record"1 (quoting State v. Tillman,
750 P.2d 546, 551 (Utah 1987))). See also Monson v. Carver. 928 P.2d 1017, 1022 (Utah
1996) (refusing to consider claims not addressed in petitions or by district court where the
defendant had "not attempted to show the applicability of either [the plain error or
exceptional circumstance] exceptions"); State v. GotschalL 782 P.2d 459,463 (Utah App.
1989) (declining to consider argument not presented to trial court or argued as plain error
on appeal).
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The claim of technical insufficiency was not preserved for appeal. Defendant
alleged the above-referenced deficiencies in his motion to dismiss on April 28, 1998.
However, defendant marshaled these alleged defects not to show that the warrant was
technically deficient, but to show that the affidavit and warrant had likely been forged or
tampered with, and the trial court heard defendant's argument only with those serious
considerations in mind (R. 389:Tab 1:1—14).11 Because defendant did not give the trial
court the opportunity to consider the argument he now raises, or argue plain error on
appeal, the Court should decline to consider it. Further, defendant has again failed to cite
to the record in support of his claim, and the only relevant authority he cites is contrary to
his position. See State v. Anderton. 668 P.2d 1258, 1261-62 (Utah 1983) (where
preprinted form affidavit in support of a search warrant was left blank concerning the date
of the informant's observations and the date the information was given to the affiant, any
defect in the affidavit caused by the blanks was required to be disregarded where the
defendants did not contend the blanks in any way infringed upon their substantial rights).
In any event, defendant's claim that the warrant and affidavit were technically
deficient is unfounded. Courts have uniformly found that technical defects in the warrant
are disregarded where the defendant's substantial rights are unaffected. See Anderton.
11

Only defendant's mistaken reference to section 77-23-204(2)(a), which provides
that "[t]he magistrate shall enter the exact time of issuance of the duplicate original
warrant on the face of the original warrant," might have suggested to the trial court that
defendant was attacking the technical sufficiency of the warrant (R. 389: Tab 1:44-45).
However, the court never addressed the argument, evidently recognizing that the
subsection relied on by defendant applied only to telephone warrants.
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688 P.2d at 1261-62, supra: State v. Bradshaw. 680 P.2d 1036, 1038 (Utah 1984) (police
chiefs failure to sign warrant affidavit in space above signature of magistrate did not
invalidate search warrant or result in prejudice to defendant, where police chief signed the
affidavit at the top of the page and swore on oath that his statements in it were true);
People v. Blake. 640 N.E.2d 317, 321 (111. App. Ct. 1994) (inadvertent omission of time,
date and judge's signature from search warrant did not necessarily invalidate warrant
where written complaint under oath was presented to issuing judge in person; apparent
purpose of requirement that search warrant show time and date of its issuance is to permit
officers executing warrant to determine whether it has expired due to passage of time and
to document time of issuance for purposes of judicial review). State v. Miller. 815
S.W.2d 28, 35 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991) (failure of search warrant to state time and date of
issuance did not require quashing of warrant and suppression of evidence derived
therefrom where warrant was applied for, issued, and executed on the same day);
Commonwealth v. Hamlin. 469 A.2d 137, 140 (Pa. 1983) (refusing to find omission of
date and time of issuance of search warrant where the defendant could not show that he
was prejudiced by the misdating).
Agent Acker testified that Judge Lyon signed and dated both the affidavit and
warrant in his presence on March 14, 1997, that Judge Lyon began to write the wrong
date on the affidavit and then corrected himself, that the warrant was served on the
afternoon of March 14, and that Agent Acker had no knowledge of any forgery of the
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documents (R. 389:Tab 1:15-16, 25-26). Finding Agent Acker's sworn testimony
credible, and contrary to defendant's assertion, see Supp. Br. App. at 10, the trial court
made substantial findings on the sufficiency of the affidavit and warrant: (1) that although
Judge Lyon, acting as magistrate, neglected to fill in the year on the affidavit, the
scribbled numeral for the day of the month on the affidavit was simply the result of Judge
Lyon's having initially made a mistake; (2) based on the trial court's familiarity with
Judge Lyon's signature, his signature on both the affidavit and the warrant appeared
genuine; (3) that the court believed that Judge Lyon had signed both the affidavit and
warrant on March 14, 1997, the date appearing on the warrant; and (4) the affidavit was
not defective and had not been modified, altered or forged (R. 389:Tab 1:58). In sum,
defendant has failed to show that his substantial rights were affected by the partial
omission of the date on the affidavit.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing discussion, the State respectfully requests that defendant's
conviction be affirmed.
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ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION NOT REQUESTED
Because this case presents no complex or novel questions, the State does not
request that it be set for oral argument or that a published opinion issue.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2*f

day of November, 1999.

JAN GRAHAM
Attorney
Attorney General
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/

Tf^MXTFTT-I
A T5T?rYNJCTrYW
KENNETH A.
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Assistant Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of the foregoing Brief of
Appellee were mailed, postage prepaid, to Maurice Richards, Public Defender
Association, Inc. of Weber County, attorneys for defendant, 2568 Washington Blvd.,
Suite 102, Ogden, Utah 84401, and Tracey Joe McCloy, pro se, P.O. Box 250, Draper,
Utah 84020, this 2 £ _ day of November, 1999.
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized.
Rule 24, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
(a) Brief of the appellant. The brief of the appellant shall contain under appropriate
headings and in the order indicated:
(1) A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the court or agency whose
judgment or order is sought to be reviewed, except where the caption of the case on
appeal contains the names of all such parties. The list should be set out on a separate
page which appears immediately inside the cover.
(2) A table of contents, including the contents of the addendum, with page references.
(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged and with parallel citations,
rules, statutes and other authorities cited, with references to the pages of the brief
where they are cited.
(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction of the appellate court.
(5) A statement of the issues presented for review, including for each issue: the
standard of appellate review with supporting authority; and
(A) citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial court; or
(B) a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved in the trial
court.
(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations whose
interpretation is determinative of the appeal or of central importance to the appeal shall
be set out verbatim with the appropriate citation. If the pertinent part of the provision is
lengthy, the citation alone will suffice, and the provision shall be set forth in an
addendum to the brief under paragraph (11) of this rule.
(7) A statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate briefly the nature of the
case, the course of proceedings, and its disposition in the court below. A statement of
the facts relevant to the issues presented for review shall follow. All statements of fact
and references to the proceedings below shall be supported by citations to the record in
accordance with paragraph (e) of this rule.
(8) Summary of arguments. The summary of arguments, suitably paragraphed, shall be
a succinct condensation of the arguments actually made in the body of the brief. It shall
not be a mere repetition of the heading under which the argument is arranged.
(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the
appellant with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for reviewing any
issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts

of the record relied on.
(10) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought.
(11) An addendum to the brief or a statement that no addendum is necessary under this
paragraph. The addendum shall be bound as part of the brief unless doing so makes the
brief unreasonably thick. If the addendum is bound separately, the addendum shall
contain a table of contents. The addendum shall contain a copy of:
(A) any constitutional provision, statute, rule, or regulation of central importance cited
in the brief but not reproduced verbatim in the brief;
(B) in cases being reviewed on certiorari, a copy of the Court of Appeals opinion; in all
cases any court opinion of central importance to the appeal but not available to the
court as part of a regularly published reporter service; and
(C) those parts of the record on appeal that are of central importance to the
determination of the appeal, such as the challenged instructions, findings of fact and
conclusions of law, memorandum decision, the transcript of the court's oral decision,
or the contract or document subject to construction.
(b) Brief of the appellee. The brief of the appellee shall conform to the requirements of
paragraph (a) of this rule, except that the appellee need not include:
(1) a statement of the issues or of the case unless the appellee is dissatisfied with the
statement of the appellant; or
(2) an addendum, except to provide material not included in the addendum of the
appellant. The appellee may refer to the addendum of the appellant.
(c) Reply brief. The appellant may file a brief in reply to the brief of the appellee, and
if the appellee has cross-appealed, the appellee may file a brief in reply to the response
of the appellant to the issues presented by the cross-appeal. Reply briefs shall be limited
to answering any new matter set forth in the opposing brief. The content of the reply
brief shall conform to the requirements of paragraph (a)(2), (3), (9), and (10) of this
rule. No further briefs may be filed except with leave of the appellate court.
(d) References in briefs to parties. Counsel will be expected in their briefs and oral
arguments to keep to a minimum references to parties by such designations as
"appellant" and "appellee." It promotes clarity to use the designations used in the lower
court or in the agency proceedings, or the actual names of parties, or descriptive terms
such as "the employee," "the injured person," "the taxpayer," etc.
(e) References in briefs to the record. References shall be made to the pages of the
original record as paginated pursuant to Rule 11(b) or to pages of any statement of the
evidence or proceedings or agreed statement prepared pursuant to Rule 11(f) or 11(g).
References to pages of published depositions or transcripts shall identify the sequential
number of the cover page of each volume as marked by the clerk on the bottom right
corner and each separately numbered page(s) referred to within the deposition or
transcript as marked by the transcriber. References to exhibits shall be made to the
exhibit numbers. If reference is made to evidence the admissibility of which is in
controversy, reference shall be made to the pages of the record at which the evidence
was identified, offered, and received or rejected.

(f) Length of briefs. Except by permission of the court, principal briefs shall not
exceed 50 pages, and reply briefs shall not exceed 25 pages, exclusive of pages
containing the table of contents, tables of citations and any addendum containing
statutes, rules, regulations, or portions of the record as required by paragraph (a) of
this rule. In cases involving cross-appeals, paragraph (g) of this rule sets forth the
length of briefs.
(g) Briefs in cases involving cross-appeals. If a cross-appeal is filed, the party first
filing a notice of appeal shall be deemed the appellant for the purposes of this rule and
Rule 26, unless the parties otherwise agree or the court otherwise orders. The brief of
the appellant shall not exceed 50 pages in length. The brief of the
appellee/cross-appellant shall contain the issues and arguments involved in the
cross-appeal as well as the answer to the brief of the appellant and shall not exceed 50
pages in length. The appellant shall then file a brief which contains an answer to the
original issues raised by the appellee/cross-appellant and a reply to the appellee's
response to the issues raised in the appellant's opening brief. The appellant's second
brief shall not exceed 25 pages in length. The appellee/cross-appellant may then file a
second brief, not to exceed 25 pages in length, which contains only a reply to the
appellant's answers to the original issues raised by the appellee/cross-appellant's first
brief. The lengths specified by this rule are exclusive of table of contents, table of
authorities, and addenda and may be exceeded only by permission of the court. The
court shall grant reasonable requests, for good cause shown.
(h) Briefs in cases involving multiple appellants or appellees. In cases involving more
than one appellant or appellee, including cases consolidated for purposes of the appeal,
any number of either may join in a single brief, and any appellant or appellee may
adopt by reference any part of the brief of another. Parties may similarly join in reply
briefs.
(i) Citation of supplemental authorities. When pertinent and significant authorities
come to the attention of a party after that party's brief has been filed, or after oral
argument but before decision, a party may promptly advise the clerk of the appellate
court, by letter setting forth the citations. An original letter and nine copies shall be
filed in the Supreme Court. An original letter and seven copies shall be filed in the
Court of Appeals. There shall be a reference either to the page of the brief or to a point
argued orally to which the citations pertain, but the letter shall without argument state
the reasons for the supplemental citations. Any response shall be made within 7 days of
filing and shall be similarly limited.
(j) Requirements and sanctions. All briefs under this rule must be concise, presented
with accuracy, logically arranged with proper headings and free from burdensome,
irrelevant, immaterial or scandalous matters. Briefs which are not in compliance may
be disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua sponte by the court, and the court may
assess attorney fees against the offending lawyer.
(k) Brief covers. The covers of all briefs shall be of heavy cover stock and shall
comply with Rule 27.

ADDENDUM B

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OR UTAH
WEBER COUNTY, OGDEN DEPARTMENT
STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff
v.

*
*
*

MEMORANDUM DECISION

*

TRACY J. MC CLOY,
Defendant

*
*

Case No. 971900382 FS
Judge Roger S. Dutson

JUL 2 0 1293
This matter is before the court on Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence. This court
has become very familiar with the facts of the case, having held several hearings, initially filed
by Defendant, acting pro se, and subsequently, by his attorney. The court has read the file in it's
entirety several times and attempted to sort out the facts. A previous decision wasfiledby the
court in about April of this year, and some of the issues are the same as were discussed in that
earlier decision. Other issues however, are raised in this motion
In the present motion, Mr. McCloy asserts that the police have dealt with him unfairly,
with undue harshness and unethically and asserts that because of that fact, the facts the
magistrate relied on are insufficient and challenge the validity of a search warrant. Additionally,
he claims the facts that the affidavit for the search warrant did not show the 'unwitting'
informant to be reliable that the magistrate did not have adequate reliable information upon
which to issue the search warrant in question. He claims the affidavit includes such items as
prior alleged criminal misconduct of Defendant, other arrests by another officer which was
prejudicial information relied on by the issuing magistrate, and other similar issues.
First, the court acknowledges there was information in the search warrant affidavit which
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-2should not have been included, including other arrests, Defendant's alleged record, etc. The
court also finds that the Ogden Police were very zealously attempting to charge this Defendant
with criminal offenses. This is based on the facts arising is this case and the court's history with
this case and collateral cases involving this Defendant. There was egregious conduct by the
officers during the execution of this or other warrants, including the shooting of the Defendant's
dog, letting it lie on the ground without providing humane treatment for some time, and the dog
eventually died from the injuries and insensitivity of the police. The court notes that in a prior
case the police conducted a search warrant and confiscated a great volume of evidence and when
the court ordered that the police either release certain items confiscated or bring charges
justifying retention of that evidence, the court was initially stonewalled by the prosecution and/or
police department in getting items released which should not have been retained. The court has
taken this police/prosecution position into consideration in reviewing the claims of the Defendant
in this case.
In reviewing a magistrates action issuing a search warrant, the court must first determine
what alleged facts are reliable upon which a magistrate could properly rely. Failure to provide
separate evidence regarding the reliability of an informant is not fatal in and of itself, and when
an informant is an 'unwitting' informant, such facts often are not available. Additionally, the
reviewing court must rely on the 'totality' of the reliable facts which were before the magistrate
at the time he issued the search warrant.
The affidavit sets forth the fact that the affiant was a 12 year veteran police officer
assigned to the narcotics strike force with a great deal of experience in drug cases, drug sales and
general drug interdiction experience. About a month earlier, affiant had been contacted by
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-3telephone by a purported resident near Defendant's residence. The complaint asserted heavy
short term traffic, both vehicular and pedestrian, with numerous different people, staying only for
short periods of time, as well as some staying longer. Such traffic peaked on Friday nights and
continued through the weekends. Some of these visitors brought VCR's, stereos and other
property to this house. Based on affiant's experience, this was common where drugs were being
sold so he began investigating the complaint. Affiant received additional information from
another agent asserting that a confidential informant had asserted that drugs could be purchased
from Defendant. This second agent advised affiant that his CI had shown himself to be reliable
in other specific instances. License numbers of vehicles going to the location were checked and
it was determined by affiant that several of the vehicles registered owners were purportedly
involved in drugs orreceiving stolen property. Another agent, agent King from another county,
provided information which should not be considered by a magistrate, but said agent King did
provide information about two purchases of drugs at Defendant's residence within fours days
before the affidavit was prepared, using a 'CI' and an 'unwitting informant' to make those buys.
He explained that the CI was wired and observed going into the residence by an undercover
agent and the unwitting buyer was observed, and the drugs field tested positively for
amphetamines. The affiant then included much improper information about Defendant's
purported criminal history and his suspicions about Defendant being involved in illegal drug
activities, some of said information which this court construes as capable of being inflammatory
towards the Defendant.
Upon careful consideration of the totality of properly included facts, and in considering
the possibility of improper inflammatory statements being included in the affidavit and an

overzealous attitude by the police towards the Defendant, the court concludes there was still
more than adequate evidence in the affidavit to support the issuance of a search warrant and
denies the Defendant's Motion to Suppress.
Dated this 17th day of July, 1998.

ROGER STDUTSON, JUDGE

^

±S

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing memorandum
decision to the following parties byfirstclass mail, postage pre-paid, this ZOdl day of July,
1998:
LES DAROCZI
Prosecuting Attorney
2380 Washington Boulevard
2nd Floor
Ogden, UT 84401
TRACY J. McCLOY
Defendant
1403 Grant Avenue
Ogden, UT 84403

TPrtM,\K/nort,
DEPUTY COURT CLERK
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IN THE 2nd District COURT
Weber COUNTY, STATE OF Utah
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT
The undersigned being first duly sworn, deposes and say©:
That the affiant has reason to bell r& that:
On the person(e) of:
Traeey J. McCloy, W, M, 51 10", 160, Mod, Blonde hair, Blue eyes, DOB
6/18/67 SSN 528080365; Ut D/L #146747099
That on the premises known as:
1612 Kiesel Ave, Ogden, Utah, Door Front door on west side, Wood frame,
White colored house. Covered porch, large square pillars supporting porch.
Address numbers 1612 on one of the posts. Rear door located at the s/e
corner of the house. Driveway located on che north side of house,
In the City of Ogden, County of Weber, State of Utah, there is
now certain property or evidence described as:
—MARIJUANA, a green leafy substance in dried form.
-Materials used to package marijuana, specifically, plastic
sandwich bags,
-Materials for using marijuana:
1. Cigarette papers, small sheets of flaxnmable paper with
adhesive on one side,
2. Pipes, used to smoke marijuana,
3. Roach clips, used to hold a marijuana cigarette while
being smoked.
-Personal notes, records of narcotic transactions, listing names,
dates, amounts sold.
-METHAMPHETAMINE, a yellowish white powdery substance.
-Materials for packaging methamphetamine, specifically small
plastic baggies.
-Materials for using methamphetamine, including hollow tubes for
snorting methamphetamine, small spoons for snorting
methamphetamine, mirrors for holding methamphetamine while being
snorted, razor blades for cutting methamphetamine into lines,
-Scales for weighing methaxnphetaming.
-Cut, substance used to dilute the methamphetamine>
•Cash and evidence of illegal narcotics transactions.
and that said property or evidence:
Was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed.
Has been used to commit or conceal a public offense.
Will be used to commit or^conceal a public offense.
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Is evidence of illegal conduct.
The facts establishing the grounds for issuance of a search warrant are:
Your Affiant is Agent Mark L. Acker
Affiant is currently assigned as an Agent with the Weber Morgan Narcotics
strike Force. Affiant is designated to investigate narcotics sales and
possession offenses occurring in the Weber and Morgan County areas.
Affiant is employed as a Police Officer with the Ogden Police Department and
has been so employed for 12 years.
Affiant was assigned to the Ogden Poiice Detective Division for 5 years.
During the assignment with the Detective Division affiant was involved in
numerous operations that involved trading stolen property for cash and
narcotics, During that period of time affiant often worked closely with the
Weber Morgan Narcotics Strike Force/ and on occasion with the Davis Metro
Strike Force. These investigations involved surveillance, visual and
electronic, documentation, controlled buys, confidential informant (CI)
control, and the drafting and serving of numerous search warrants. These
investigations resulted in arrests, successful prosecution, property
recovery, and the recovery of illicit narcotics.
Affiant is a graduate of the Utah Police Standards and Training Academy.
Affiant is a graduate of the Utah Police Standards and Training Drug Academy,
Affiant has successfully completed the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)
Operation Jetway Airport/Train Station/Small Package Interdiction School.
Affiant has attended the 1995 and 1996 Utah Narcotics Officers Association
annual training conferences and received training in narcotics
investigations, CI management, electronic and visual surveillance techniques,
under cover investigations, clandestine methamphetamine laboratories, and
other drug interdiction instructions.
Affiant received a block of training in Narcotics related Financial
Investigation in February of 1996.
Affiant has received several Ogden Police Department good work awards, and
received the Business Leaders Against Organized Crime (BLOCK) Officer of the
Year award for exceptional Police work for property sting operations
conducted while working in the Detective Division. Your affiant was awarded
the Ogden City Police Department Employee of the Month for August of 1996.
Your affiant was awarded the Utah Narcotics Officers Association (UNOA)
narcotics officer of the year for the State of Utah, Region 1, in September
of 1996.
During the first week of February of this year your affiant was
contacted via telephone by an area resident about suspected drug sales
activity at 1612 Kiesel Ave. and the involvement in that activity by the
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resident there, who is Tracey McCloy. The citizen complainant told your
affiant that there is heavy vehicle and pedestrian traffic at this residence,
with numerous people in and out of the house all hours oZ che day and night.
The complainant told your affiant that much of the traffic in and out of this
house is short term, with the visitors staying for short periods of time,
while others will stay for an hour or so. The complainant told your affiant
that the traffic and activity peaks on Friday nights and continues on through
the weekend. The complainant also claims to have seen people bring VCRs,
stereos and other property items to "6his house. The complainant lives in the
area, has witnessed this activity personally, and was very concerned about
the activity.
Your affiant knows through experience that heavy short term traffic,
in particular on weekends, is a indication of drug sales and use. In
addition the report of individuals taking property items into this residence
increases the likelihood of illegal activity. Your affiant is aware that the
trade of property, often stolen property, is becoming increasingly popular
with the drug community. Based on the complaint your affiant began an
investigation into suspect Tracey Joe McCloy at 1612 Kiesel Ave.
Shortly after taking the telephone complaint your affiant had a
discussion with Agent Vanorden concerning Tracey McCloy and his residence at
a.612 Kiesel. Your affiant learned from this conversation that Agent Vanorden
has been involved with a confidential informant (CI) who is familiar with
Tracey McCloy. This informant told Vanorden that methamphetamine could be
purchased at McCloy's residence readily. The informant also told Vanorden
that a great deal of stolen property from the Ogden area is being traded for
methamphetamine at McCloy'e residence. According to the informant Tracey
McCloy is involved in the sales of methamphetamine and the stolen property
trade. Your affiant learned from Agent Vanorden that this informant has
conducted at least five controlled narcotics buys under the direction of
Agent Vanorden which have resulted in multiple arrests and convictions,
generated at least two successful search warrants, and resulted in the
seizure of illegal narcotics. The information this informant has provided to
Agent Vanorden has proved reliable.
The citizen who called this complaint in to your affiant also
provided your affiant with a list of license plate numbers that the citizen
copied down from vehicles making stops at Tracey McCloy«s residence at 1612
Kiesel. Your affiant conducted registration checks on these vehicle license
numbers and found that at least three of these vehicles are registered to
individuals reported to be involved in narcotics use, and at least one
individual who has a history of thefts. At least one of these individuals
shows, through an Ogden Police computer records check, to be an associate of
Tracey McCloy.
On 3/13/97 your affiant was contacted by Agent Brad King, Davis
County Metro Narcotics with information concerning suspect Tracey McCloy at
1612 Kiesel. I learned from Agent King that within the past four days Agent
King has conducted two controlled narcotics buys from the residence at 1612
Kiesel. Agent King used an informant (CI) and an unwitting informant to
accomplish these buys. A quantity of methamphetamine was purchased from that
residence during each of the buys. Agent King used CI control methods,
including searching the CI before and after the transaction, placing a
transmitter on the CI and monitoring the transaction electronically and
visually. Agent King and„assisting Agents also followed the CI and the
PAGE 3
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unwitting informant to 1612 Kiesel, During one of the buys a Davis Metro
Narcotics agent, working in an undercover capacity, went with the CI and the
unwitting informant, and observed the unwitting go into 1612 Kiesel to make
the purchase. During the other transaction Agent King and assisting agents
witnessed the same unwitting go into the same residence at 1612 Kiesel, and
come back out of the residence after the purchase was made. The purchased
drug from both buys was field tested by Davis Metro agents and found positive
for amphetamines.
On the same date, 3/13/97, your affiant received additional
information from Agent Brad King, Davis Metro Narcotics, concerning
activities at 1612 Kiesel. Agent King informed your affiant that his agency
arrested another suspect, in Davis County on drug related charges on March
13th. This person is not connected with the investigation that Agent King
has been conducting at 1612 Kiesel. The person who was arrested told Davis
Metro agents that he/she is buying methamphetamine from a male by the name of
Tracey who lives in Ogden, in a white house on Kiesel, between 16th and 17th
streets. This same person also told Davis Metro agents that this Tracey has
stolen property, such as stereos, in his residence. The arrested person
claims that Tracey never leaves his house, and sells up to ounces of
methamphetamine at a time from his house. This information is very similar
to the information received on citizen complaints and from other informants.
Further grounds for issuance of a search warrant are attached hereto and
incorporated herein.
Your affiant has verified the above information from the confidential
informant(s) to be correct and accurate through the following independent
investigation:
Your affiant has searched Ogden Police computer records and found
information concerning suspect Tracey McCloy and reported activities at his
residence, 1612 Kiesel Ave. Your affiant located another citizen complaint
taken in December of 1996. The complaint stated that two individuals are
buying methamphetamine from a person who lives at 1612 Kiesel. The complaint
also stated that guns and stolen property are being sold from that address.
Your affiant is familiar with one of the names given in that complaint as a
person who buys methamphetamine from 1612 Kiesel. Your affiant knows that
person to be involved in the sales and use of methamphetamine. Your affiant
has learned this information from another informant who has worked with your
affiant within the past three months. Your affiant has also been involved in
narcotics cases in which this person was a suspect.
Your affiant has located at least one other complaint taken in
November of 1996 that specifically names Tracey McCloy as a person who sells
methamphetamine and marijuana. The complaint also specifies the address of
1612 Kiesel where Tracey McCloy lives and sells drugs from.
Your affiant has located at least one other complaint of suspected
drug use/sales at 1612 Kiesel dating back to 1995.
Your affiant has found verification through Ogden Police computer
records that Tracey Joe McCloy has given an address of 1612 Kiesel Ave. as
his residence. Case information shows that address reported as being Tracy
McCloy's address as recent as October of 1996. Your affiant has also found
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that Tracey McCloy has a prior drug distribution arrest as recent as 1995,
drug arrests prior to 1995, has been a suspect in a drug sales case in 1994,
and was the suspect in yet another complaint of suspected drug involvement in
1994.
Your affiant has also located in the State Wide Warrant system an
active protective order, listing Tracey Joe Mccloy, DOB 6/18/67 as the
respondent, and listing hie address as 1612 Kiesel, This information matches
the information your affiant has found for suspect Tracey McCloy named in
this affidavit.
Your affiant knows Tracey McCloy to be involved in the use of illicit
narcotics, as well as his involvement in the sales of these drugs. Your
affiant has, learned through experience that individuals involved in the sales
and use of narcotics often carry a quantity of the drug on their person, as
well as drug paraphernalia and cash proceeds from the sales of drugs.
Narcotics sold at street level quantities are easily concealed on a person.
Your affiant has personally observed the residence at 1612 Kiesel
Ave. and has the observed the address numbers of 1612 on a pillar on the
front porch of that residence.
WHEREFORE, the affiant prays that the search warrant be issued for the
seizure of said items in the day time.

AFFIANT
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this
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IN THE 2nd D i s t r i c t COURT
COUNTY OP Weber, STATE OF Utah
SEARCH WARRAOT
Proof by A f f i d a v i t under o a t h h a v i n g been made t h i s day b e f o r e roe by Mark L.

Acker, I am s a t i s i f i e d that there i s probable cause to b e l i e v e t h a t :
on the person[a) of:
Tracey J. McCloy, W, M, 5' 10", 160, Med. Blonde hair, Blue eyes, 6/18/67,
SSN 525060365; Other features are: Ut D/L #146747099
on the premises known as:
1612 Kiesel Ave, Ogden, Utah Door Front door on west side, Wood frame,
White colored house. Covered porch, large square pillars supporting porch.
Address numbers 1612 on one of the posts. Rear door located at the s/e
corner of the house. Driveway located on the north side of house.
In the City of Ogden, County of Weber, State of Utah, there is now being
possessed or concealed certain property or evidence described as;
-MARIJUANA, a green leafy substance in dried Conn.
-Materials used to pacfcage marijuana, specifically, plastic
sandwich bags.
-Materials for using marijuana:
1. Cigarette papers, small sheets of flammable paper with
adhesive on one side,
2. Pipes, used to smoke marijuana,
3. Roach clips, used to hold a marijuana cigarette while
being smoked.
-Personal notes, records of narcotic transactions, listing names,
dates, amounts sold.
- M E T H A M P H E T A M I N E , a yellowish white powdery substance.
-Materials for packaging methamphetamine, specifically small
plastic baggies,
-Materials for using methamphetamine, including hollow tubes for
snorting methamphetamine, small spoons for snorting
methamphetamine, mirrors for holding methamphetamine while being
snorted, razor blades for cutting methamphetamine into lines,
-Scales for weighing methamphetamine.
-Cat. substance used to dilute the methamphet amine.
-Cash and evidence of illegal narcotic transactions.
and that said property or evidence:
Was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed.
Has been used to commit or conceal a public offense.
Will be used to commit or conceal a public offense.
Is evidence of illegal conduct.
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You are therefore commanded in the day time to raaXe a search of the above
named or described person(s), vehicle(s)/ and premise(e) for the herein above
named or described property or evidence and if you find the same or any part
thereof, to bring it forthwith before me an the 2nd District Court, County of
Weber, State of Utah, or retain such property in your custody, subject to the
order of this court,
GIVEN UNDER MY HAND and dated this.
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